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Designing a default structure 
Submission to the  
Inquiry into Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness1 
Nicholas Barr2 and Peter Diamond3 
 
Summary of recommendations 
This submission starts from three propositions: 
• The primary purpose of pensions is old-age economic security. 
• People who wish to make choices about pensions and retirement should generally 
have room to do so. But, as the Cooper Review and Murray Inquiry and widespread 
international evidence make clear, some people will not make choices, choice can be 
costly, and some people may make bad choices. Thus: 
• The pension system should work well also for people who make no choice – and 
making no choice should be an acceptable option. 
To those ends, section 2 sets out recommendations and justifications for the 
accumulation phase: 
1. A single default.   
• There should be a single default design, the same life-cycle structure for 
everyone in the default. 
• That default should be provided by an independent government agency.  
2. A simple choice architecture within the default.  
• The agency providing the default should also provide some portfolio choices, 
allowing limited choice within the structure. While no choice is an option, 
people might respond to simply-stated options within the default structure. 
• A worker who has previously chosen a provider should have the option of 
switching to the default. 
• A worker should have the option to save more than the minimum in the 
mandatory system, given its advantages of scale and design.  
3. One account per person. To avoid ‘lost accounts’ and reduce administrative costs, 
each worker should have a single account. That account could be the default or could 
be with a provider chosen by the worker, with the worker retaining the power to move 
his/her account to a different provider. 
4. A single clearing house. To prevent multiple accounts and reduce administrative 
costs, a government-run clearing house should collect contributions and distribute 
them to providers. This is the process in Sweden for the Premium Pension.  
                                               
1 We are grateful to the UK National Employment Savings Trust for assistance on factual matters. 
2 Professor of Public Economics, European Institute, London School of Economics; N.Barr@lse.ac.uk  
3 Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Nobel Laureate; pdiamond@mit.edu  
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5. A single record keeper. In addition to collection and distribution, the government 
agency should be the record keeper for all accounts. This is the process in Sweden for 
the Premium Pension. 
6. A level playing field for competition between the government-run default and related 
portfolios and the private providers. The clearing house should have a uniform set of 
charges for collection and record keeping, which apply equally to private providers 
and the government-run default. This is the process in Sweden for the Premium 
Pension. 
Section 2.2 provides some less tightly-specified alternatives, drawing on work by the 
UK National Employment Savings Trust. 
Section 3 sets out recommendations and justifications for the drawdown phase for 
both the default and private providers. The focus is to simplify and improve the choice 
architecture.  
1. Presentation of the roles of drawdown options and likely patterns, given market 
conditions. The three elements below draw on current work by the UK National 
Employment Savings Trust. 
• Curated drawdown. Each member is advised on what drawdown trajectory, given 
market conditions, is most likely to give a sustainable income indexed to price 
inflation, though the member retains the flexibility to withdraw more or less.  
• A liquid cash component, to allow for unexpected expenditures without 
jeopardising a member’s long-run income stream.   
• An annuity component. Purchase of an immediate or a deferred annuity beginning 
at a certain age, e.g. 80. Deferred annuities are useful both to allow drawdown 
over a known period (i.e. until the start date of the deferred annuity) and to protect 
against old-age poverty.  
2. Information on annuities. As further assistance to choice, providers of annuities 
should be required to provide directly comparable price and design details through a 
government-run information website, as in Chile.  
3. Default portfolio. After retirement age, workers not choosing a provider or portfolio 
for assets will be in the default life-cycle portfolio held by the government agency for 
default.   
4.  Survivors’ pensions. Decumulation, whether from a lump-sum or as an annuity, 
should take account of family circumstances. Information should be provided about 
potential family circumstances. The main argument for joint-life annuitisation of at 
least a part of a worker’s accumulation is to prevent poverty for the surviving spouse, 
most often the wife. A worker’s accumulation could be used to buy a joint-life 
annuity. In a two-earner couple this could be done by both partners. 
Section 4 concludes; and the Appendix discusses the literature on the uses and 
limitations of individual choice and competition.  
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1. This submission is primarily directed at the Inquiry’s terms of reference concerning 
(a) costs, fees and net returns and (b) the design of default arrangements. It is intended as a 
framework rather than a fully worked out explicit proposal, for which we don’t have 
sufficient detailed background knowledge.  
 
2. Section 1 briefly outlines the problems identified by the Cooper Review and Murray 
Inquiry in Australia, reinforced by considerable international evidence. Section 2 sets out our 
recommendations for default arrangements during accumulation with discussion of relevant 
international experience; section 3 does the same for drawdown. An Appendix gives the 
theoretical and international empirical evidence that underpin our recommendations, drawing 
on the manuscript of a book in progress and earlier writing (Barr and Diamond (2008; 2010), 
Barr (2012, Ch. 7)). 
 
1 The backdrop 
1.1 Findings in Australia and other countries 
3. The Murray Inquiry found that, 
‘[T]he current framework is not sufficient. The [Global Financial Crisis] brought to light 
significant numbers of Australian consumers holding financial products that did not suit 
their needs and circumstances — in some cases resulting in severe financial loss. The 
most significant problems related to shortcomings in disclosure and financial advice, and 
over-reliance on financial literacy’ (Australia Financial System Inquiry (the Murray 
Inquiry), 2014, p. 27). 
 
4. Those conclusions echo those of the Cooper Review: 
‘There are three sources of market failure in superannuation: member inertia and 
disengagement; product complexity and low consumer financial literacy; and conflicted 
remuneration structures within the financial planning industry’ (Australia Industry Super 
Network, 2010, p. 1). 
5. Both sets of conclusions are in line with what happens in other OECD countries with 
pension systems that include choice from multiple private providers. The findings relate to 
both the supply of financial products and consumer behaviour.  
 
6. THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE MARKET. Three sets of issues stand out. 
• Charges: charges during accumulation are high and vary widely across providers; and 
higher charges are not generally correlated with better performance (see also Minifie 
2014).  
• Financial advice: 
• Problems arise even where providers generally try to do a good job. For 
example, it is not clear how to choose a good financial adviser.  
• Limited competence: complexity means that some advisers may not do a good 
job on some issues. 
• Biased advice: advisers may suggest the wrong product or the wrong price. 
• Deception: lack of consumer information and missing or ineffective regulation 
creates a risk of misleading advertising and misselling. 
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• Drawdown; the previous problems apply also when workers draw down their pension 
saving or choose an annuity provider. The problem is compounded by annuity 
markets that are frequently thin and often offer poor value. Selection issues associated 
with varying life expectancies complicate both normative and regulatory 
considerations.  
 
7. CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR. The Murray Inquiry also looked at the demand side of the 
market, and in in particular the extent to which consumers generally do not behave in ways 
that the simple model of rational behaviour predicts. Instead there is a lack of consumer 
engagement, with sluggish responses and poor choices, including making no choice. The 
design of the default needs to respond to the expectation that widespread absence of choice of 
a provider is inevitable and that a well-designed default institution can help with some 
decision making. 
 
8. Given its remit, the Inquiry looked mainly at the supply side. This submission takes 
those findings as read, and includes an appendix on consumer behaviour, which is the key to 
understanding why (a) the findings of the Inquiry are no accident, (b) what they imply for 
organising pensions, and in particular (c) why default arrangements are necessary and how 
they should be designed. 
 
1.2   Preliminary implications 
9. The recommendations in sections 2 and 3 are based on two sets of implications we 
draw from Australian and international research and experience:  
• Financial choices are made in a complex environment. The usefulness of choice 
should not be overstated, as choices are often avoided and often poorly made. 
Financial education and delegated choice are no more than partial solutions.  
• The quality of outcomes from more reliance on competition in the market is 
frequently overstated; the simple model of choice and competition does not work 
well.  
 
10. Significant absence of choice is inevitable, so a well-designed default helps many 
workers who are not in a good position to evaluate alternatives. That line of argument does 
not (and should not) rule out the room for some degree of choice for all workers.  
 
2  Designing a default structure: Accumulation 
2.1 Recommendations 
11. Our main argument is that there should be a single, government-organised default 
life-cycle structure.  Both the default and the pension system as a whole would benefit from a 
single contribution collector and record-keeper. The default structure has the following 
elements. 
 
12. 1.  A SINGLE DEFAULT.  There should be a single default structure provided by an 
independent government agency for workers who make no choice;  The default should have a 
lifecycle formation. 
 
13. The inevitable need for a default. The observed fact is that many people do not make 
choices. They do not do so for a variety of reasons, discussed in the Appendix: 
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• Some are aware of limitations in their capacity to make complex choices, and view 
the default as a safe answer. 
• For others, procrastination and simple avoidance of consideration of choice occur. 
This is a situation where the benefits (higher returns, lower charges) in any particular 
month are small, while the transactions costs in terms of time can be significant. 
For both sets of reasons, a default arrangement is necessary for people who do not choose. 
 
14. Why a single default provider? Australia has multiple funds each with a default. In 
New Zealand, the government has designated nine default providers on the basis of 
competitive bidding. A worker who makes no choice is allocated to a fund in what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘cab rank’ principle. A major problem with multiple default 
accounts, however organised, is that diversity of default accounts will result in diversity in 
realized rates of return between workers of the same age, which is likely to generate 
dissatisfaction and possible political hostility. Having multiple default plans is like a Post 
Office with 10 windows and 10 queues, so that queuing time is a random luck of the draw; a 
single queue for all 10 windows is widely regarded as fairer. 
 
15. Having a single default: 
• Avoids the problem of diverse returns.  
• Provides a simpler picture for a worker of the consequences of not making a choice. 
• Reduces costs by avoiding complexity in policing multiple defaults and, in a system 
of industry plans each with a default, the repeated need to relocate assets for workers 
using a default who move across industries. 
 
16. 2.  A SIMPLE CHOICE ARCHITECTURE WITHIN THE DEFAULT.  A person who is 
reluctant to make a complex choice might, nevertheless, be willing and able to make some 
simple choices if framed appropriately. To that end, the agency providing the default should 
also provide some limited degree of choice. As outlined in section 2.2, the default for NEST 
pensions in the UK is a fund with a target date set at the state pension age, but offering 
workers the option to choose an earlier or later target date and/or a fund with a higher- or 
lower-risk portfolio mix than the default. The same is true of the default arrangements in 
Sweden, also discussed in section 2.2. Fewer choices can increase participation (Box 1), and 
Keim and Mitchell (2015) find that streamlining options in defined-contribution plans 
significantly reduced turnover and expense ratios.  
 
17. A worker who previously chose a provider should be allowed to switch to the default 
provider. Initially in Sweden workers who chose a fund were not thereafter allowed to move 
to the default.  As a result of popular pressure, they are now allowed to do so.4  
 
18. The default could manage a complex portfolio, as is done in Sweden, or could use a 
simple portfolio of mutual funds with competitive bidding for the funds in the simple 
portfolio, as is done in the USA for federal civil servants by the Thrift Savings Plan. 
 
19. It is also beneficial, as in Australia, that workers can save more than the minimum in 
the mandatory system, given its advantages of scale and design. In a defined-contribution 
plan there are good reasons for limiting tax advantages but no reason to limit contributions.5 
                                               
4 For more detailed discussion of the system in Sweden, see Barr (2013). 
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20. 3.  ONE ACCOUNT PER PERSON. In a system with multiple providers of individual 
accounts, a worker who changes jobs could transfer his/her accumulation from old to new 
employer. In practice, many workers do not do so and, as a result, have multiple pension 
accounts. The resulting problems are twofold: ‘lost accounts’ and administrative costs. The 
latter arises because the cost of managing an account has a large fixed cost component – 
record keeping for and communications about a large account does not cost much more than 
for a small one. Thus the burden of charges is greater for multiple accounts than for a single 
account of equal total size. 
 
21. For both reasons, it is highly desirable that each person has one and only one account. 
That account can be with a provider chosen by the worker; and the worker can choose to 
move the account to a different provider; or a worker can make no choice and be in the 
default. 
 
22. We recommend that new entrants to the workforce should be required to have only 
one account.  It would be desirable to consolidate the accounts of current workers with 
multiple accounts via mandate, subsidy or nudge. How to do so requires additional study. 
 
23. 4.  A SINGLE CLEARING HOUSE. A government agency should collect contributions 
and distribute them to providers. This is the arrangement in Sweden for the Premium Pension, 
outlined in section 2.2.  
 
24. 5.  A SINGLE RECORD KEEPER. In addition to collection and distribution, the agency 
should be the record keeper for all accounts. This is the process in Sweden for the Premium 
Pension. 
 
25. Centralising record keeping and the collection and distribution of contributions to 
each worker’s chosen fund or to the default has advantages. The approach: 
• Exploits administrative economies of scale. 
• Provides an effective and cheap way of enforcing the single-account rule. 
• Incorporates a rational division of labour between account administration (i.e. record 
keeping) and fund management. There are clear arguments for centralising the former, 
with competition over the latter. 
 
26. 6.  A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT-RUN 
DEFAULT AND PRIVATE PROVIDERS. The clearing house should have a uniform set of charges 
for collection and record keeping, which apply equally to private providers and the 
government-run default. 
 
27. CHOICE AND COMPETITION. The Productivity Commission’s draft response (Australia 
Productivity Commission 2017) rightly makes the distinction between competition in the 
market and competition for the market, and suggests the usefulness of the latter approach.  
The analysis in the Appendix supports that argument. In the arrangements we suggest above, 
an individual can choose: 
                                                                                                                                                  
5 A system in which a worker’s contributions are tax-advantaged up to a limit faces a complication where a 
worker contributes more than the limit. That complication does not arise where contributions are not tax 
advantaged, as in Australia. 
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• To do nothing and thus be in the default fund. Doing nothing should be seen as an 
entirely appropriate option, either because workers feel that they do not know enough 
to do better, or because they do not engage. To our personal knowledge, a number of 
leading Swedish pension experts are in the default fund because they consider it the 
best option; or 
• To choose a fund from the limited menu of choices offered by the default agency; or 
• To choose funds from a single provider chosen from the market for providers. 
 
28. IN SUM.  
• Nobody is denied choice if he/she wishes to exercise it but, equally, nobody is forced 
to make choices. 
• Mobile workers who do nothing avoid membership in one of multiple employer-
organised defaults, but belong to the single default. 
• Financial markets do what they are meant to – to channel savings into productive 
investment – in a market that is better-informed on both sides. 
 
2.2 International experience 
29. The experiences of curated accumulation in the default arrangements for the auto-
enrolment plan in the UK and the mandatory system in Sweden are directly relevant. 
 
30. CURATED ACCUMULATION IN THE UK NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SAVINGS TRUST 
(NEST pensions; UK National Employment Savings Trust 2015, 2017a, b).  The basic NEST 
accumulation is a target-date fund with a foundation phase, a growth phase and a 
consolidation phase.6 
• The foundation phase – a novelty in pension design – operates for about the first five 
years of an accumulation with the primary aim of developing the saving habit. 
Research has shown that losses in the early years are profoundly discouraging, so the 
investment strategy during this phase seeks to keep pace with inflation and avoid 
investment shocks that would reduce the value of the nascent accumulation. Such an 
arrangement is regarded as helpful in an auto-enrolment plan but may be less relevant 
in a mandatory system. 
• The growth phase, once the pot is established, can adopt a less conservative approach. 
NEST’s aim is to produce a long-run average annual real return of 3 per cent net of all 
charges. Since its launch in 2012, the 2040 target date fund has produced an average 
annual real return of about 6 per cent.  
• The consolidation phase (about the last ten years before the worker’s target retirement 
date) starts to crystallise the gains. 
 
31. NEST decides in-house on overall exposure to building block funds and asset classes, 
outsourcing fund management to the private sector and publishing quarterly updates on 
strategic allocation and fund returns.7  
                                               
6 NEST Retirement Date Funds, https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/nest/aboutnest/investment-
approach/nest-retirement-date-funds.html  
7 Investment Implementation Document, 
https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/nest/aboutnest/investment-approach/other-fund-choices/fund-
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32. The total charge to the worker, including record keeping and investment costs, is 
1.8% of each year’s contributions plus a 0.3% annual management charge on a worker’s total 
accumulation, equivalent to an annual management charge for the average member of about 
0.5%. 
 
33. Alongside target date funds are additional options for workers, including a Higher 
Risk (i.e. potentially higher growth) Fund, an Ethical Fund, a Sharia Fund, and a Lower 
Growth (i.e. lower risk) Fund. 
 
34. CURATED ACCUMULATION: THE SWEDISH DEFAULT (AP7 SÅFA). 45 per cent of pension 
savers in the Premium Pension in Sweden are in the default fund, which manages 30 percent 
of capital in the Premium Pension system. The main building blocks are the AP7 Equity Fund 
and Fixed Income Funds. The lifecycle portfolio is an age-dependent mix of these two funds.  
 
35. The Equity Fund investment strategy8 is to 
• Invest globally in equities with a diverse spread; 
• Increase returns through leverage; and 
• Further raise returns through active management in selected markets. 
 
36. The mix of the two funds reflects the fact that the Premium Pension is a small part of 
the overall mandatory pension system in Sweden. It gets 2.5 per cent of earnings out of the 
18.5 per cent that are collected. There is also widespread industry coverage. The savings of 
workers under age 55 are invested 100% in the AP7 Equity Fund. Thereafter the balance 
between that fund and a fixed income fund tips over time. From age 75 onwards the mix is 
two-thirds fixed-income fund, one third equity fund.  
 
37. The most recent Orange Report (Sweden Pensions Agency 2016, p. 45) states that,  
‘Those who … had their moneys invested in the AP7 [Equity Fund], … had by December 
31, 2016 obtained a return on moneys invested in December, 2000, greater by 59 
percentage points than that of the average fund saver (premium pension index, which 
includes AP7 Såfa).’ 
 
38. The UK and Sweden show two examples of the investment procedure in the 
underlying funds that are combined for the lifecycle portfolio. What would be best for 
Australia is beyond our knowledge base to discuss. 
 
39. THE CENTRAL CLEARING HOUSE IN SWEDEN.  Government-run agencies in Sweden 
have two functions, as contribution collector and as record keeper. On the first, the tax 
authority collects income tax and each worker’s 18.5 per cent pension contribution. The tax 
authority passes on contributions to the Swedish Pensions Agency, which channels 16 per 
cent to the Swedish NDC system and 2½ per cent to the Premium Pension, which goes to the 
worker’s chosen (or default) pension funds. Workers can choose up to five funds from 844 
such funds from 109 different providers (figures for 31 December 2016), with a government-
run default for those who make no choice or actively choose the default. 
                                                                                                                                                  
factsheets.html and Quarterly Investment Report, 
https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/nest/aboutnest/investment-approach/other-fund-choices/fund-
factsheets.html  
8 For further detail, see Our Approach, https://www.ap7.se/english/about-us/our-approach/  
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40. To keep administrative costs low, the clearing house is also a central record keeper, 
with net payments to and from mutual funds on an aggregated basis. 
 
41. Since the Premium Pension has important similarities with arrangements in Australia, 
its administrative costs are of particular interest. In 2016, the average capital being managed 
in the Premium Pension system was SEK 854 billion and total administrative costs SEK 3.07 
billion, i.e. 0.36% of funds under management (Sweden Pensions Agency (2016, pp. 38 and 
40).9  
 
3 Designing a default structure:  Drawdown 
3.1 Recommendations 
42. At present, Australia has no restrictions on how a person draws down his/her 
accumulation after pension age. In contrast, Sweden requires purchase of an annuity from the 
government, and Chile limits withdrawals to limit later reliance on a government-provided 
minimum benefit.  
 
43. Generally, the pensions literature has studied drawdown less fully than accumulation, 
and further complication comes from the significant presence of selection issues for 
annuities. Moreover, concern with consumption over a lifetime of unknown length is more 
complicated than accumulating wealth up to retirement. Thus we limit our recommendations 
to the provision of information and general guidance, both of which are relevant for those 
with the default and those without. As illustrations, we draw on the way the system in Chile 
gives advice and provides price information on annuity options, and on work by NEST 
pensions in the UK. The latter presents information related to maintaining consumption 
through an uncertain lifetime, including the roles for a liquid component and a deferred 
annuity. 
 
44. 1.  PRESENTATION OF THE ROLES OF DRAWDOWN OPTIONS AND LIKELY PATTERNS, 
GIVEN MARKET CONDITIONS. 
 
45. Curated drawdown. The approach in NEST is to try to help retirees avoid drawing 
down too fast or too slowly by advising on what drawdown trajectory, given market 
conditions, is most likely to give them a sustainably steady income indexed to price inflation. 
A member can choose to follow that guidance, with the drawdown fund generating a certain 
level of income, but  retains the flexibility to withdraw a higher (or lower) income – although 
drawing more reduces the size of the fund and by extension his/her future income prospects.   
 
46. A liquid cash component. This element, the design of which remains a work in 
progress under NEST, is intended to explain the allowance for unexpected expenditures 
without jeopardising a member’s long-run income stream.  
‘If market conditions are good in the drawdown fund then this pot can be topped up 
with additional lump sums. This would be a fund from which members could move 
money in ad hoc lump sums into their bank account to use as they like’.10  
 
                                               
9 For exemplary detail on administrative costs, see Sweden Pensions Agency (2016, p. 41). 
10 https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/news/NEST-launches-its-retirement-
blueprint-in-response-to-pension-freedoms.html  
Australia Productivity Commission  10 9 September 2017 
 
47. A deferred annuity. While an immediate annuity purchased with part of the 
accumulation is a good option, NEST pays particular attention to deferred annuities. In this 
element – again a work in progress – money is set aside to buy a deferred annuity at a certain 
age,  
‘This would remain refundable up to a certain age, at which point that money is 
locked in to ensure a secure income is available for the remainder of a member’s life 
to protect against the risk of running out of money before they die.’11 
 
48. 2.  INFORMATION ABOUT ANNUITIES. Providers of annuities should be required to 
provide directly comparable price and design details through a government-run information 
website. This should apply throughout the pension system, and not only for the default. The 
arrangement in Chile is discussed in section 3.2. 
 
49. 3.  DEFAULT PORTFOLIO.  After retirement age, workers not choosing a provider or 
portfolio for assets will be in the default life-cycle portfolio held by the government agency 
for default. 
 
50. 4.  SURVIVORS’ PENSIONS. Decumulation, whether from a lump-sum or as an annuity, 
should take account of family circumstances. The main argument for joint-life annuitisation 
of at least of a part of a worker’s accumulation is to prevent poverty for the surviving spouse, 
most often the wife. The root of such poverty is twofold.  
• There are economies of scale in household formation. A single survivor of a couple 
typically needs about 65-70 per cent of the couple’s income to maintain a broadly 
constant standard of living. Thus, if spouses are the same age and have identical 
earnings histories and identical pension benefits, the death of one may lower the 
living standard of the other. This is part of the reason why poverty is more frequent 
among widows than among married elderly women.  
• In addition, older women on average have had lower earnings and/or lower 
contribution densities than men as well as having longer expected lives.  
 
51. For both reasons, survivor pensions are important for preserving the living standards 
of the elderly. A worker’s accumulation could be used to buy a joint-life annuity with a 
suitable fraction (e.g. 50 per cent) for the survivor, based on the actuarial conversion of a 
single-life annuity into the relevant joint-life annuity. In a two-earner couple this could be 
done by both partners. Providing information on methods of family protection would be 
useful. 
 
3.2 International experience  
52. MANDATORY INFORMATION IN CHILE. As with the accumulation phase, Chile 
experimented with different ways of organizing the purchase of annuities. One element in 
reform has been an attempt to reduce costs by strengthening competition in the annuities 
market.  To that end, reform in 2004 introduced SCOMP (the Pension Amounts Queries and 
Offers System), which provides clear, complete and comparable information about the 
pension benefits offered by different providers. A person who wants to start benefits is 
obliged to consult SCOMP, though not obliged to buy an annuity. 
 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
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53. OUTCOMES WITHOUT AN INFORMATION MANDATE: THE UK. 
‘In 2012, 60% of annuities were purchased through the customer’s existing pension 
provider or a third party with which their provider has an arrangement’ (UK Financial 
Conduct Authority 2014, p. 12). 
‘We estimate that overall 80% of those purchasing an annuity from their existing 
pension provider would benefit from shopping around and switching. For standard 
annuities we estimate 79% could get a better deal on the open market, and for 
enhanced annuities the proportion is 91%.  (ibid. p. 14). 
 
4  Concluding remarks  
54. Our recommendations start from the fact that many people do not choose, and 
widespread evidence that those who do choose frequently do not choose well. Thus a default 
is necessary and, if well-designed, potentially beneficial in both cases. In the present system 
in Australia, workers who make no choice end up in the default designed by a provider 
chosen by the employer. As explained earlier, this is an unsatisfactory aspect of the 
superannuation system.  
 
55. We have addressed some key elements in improving outcomes for those not making 
choices. The central element is a single life-cycle based default run by a single government 
agency. Our model for this design is the successful experience in Sweden and NEST pensions 
in the UK. In addition, we draw on the Swedish experience to propose further aspects of the 
use of an agency handling the default.  
 
56. For drawdown, where needs are more variable and the subject less well analysed, we 
have focused only on the provision of better information to those entering the drawdown 
phase with the default provider of the accumulation phase. Better provision of information is 
likely to be beneficial throughout the system, and not just for those in the default fund.  
 
57. Inevitably the response of some analysts to a proposed increase in the role of 
government is to call for encouraging more competition. As experience in Chile since 1981 
has made clear, free competition is a weak force in the pension accumulation process, and 
even highly regulated competition is considerably limited. In the Appendix, we review some 
of the reasons why this is the case. 
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Appendix: Supporting evidence and arguments 
58. A potentially complementary approach to default design is an effort to increase active 
choice and hence decrease the need for defaults. This appendix reviews some of analysis 
behind our recommendations and, in doing so, reinforces the findings of the Cooper Review 
and Murray Inquiry. 
 
59. Our central argument about pensions is twofold: 
• Widespread absence of choice is inevitable, as is some degree of poor choices.  
• Increasing competition in the market is an inadequate response, and can be 
counterproductive.  
Thus, adapting to widespread default is a better approach than trying to force considerably 
more choice. A well-designed default is not a regrettable necessity but an essential and 
beneficial element in a pension system. 
 
60. Section A.1 summarises the considerable evidence about what people do, and section 
A.2 explores why. Section A.3 is about what firms do. Pulling the threads together, section 
A.4 sets out a central implication: that the conventional model of rational choice and free 
competition is not a good fit for pensions for many people. Section A.5 briefly addresses 
some counter-arguments to our proposals. 
 
A.1 What people do 
During accumulation 
61. Mistakes are common and come in many varieties. 
 
62. MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS. In a system with multiple providers workers can end up with 
multiple pension accounts, leading to lost accounts and avoidable administrative charges. 
 
63. DELAYED CHOICE OR NO CHOICE. Experience in Sweden is illuminating. The Premium 
Pension asks workers to choose a portfolio of up to five funds from nearly 850 private mutual 
funds. Despite a major effort at public education at the time the system was introduced, 
initially one-third of workers went into the default fund. In the initial design, once a person 
had chosen a fund he/she was not allowed to move to the default fund. As a result of public 
pressure, since 2010 workers have been allowed to choose the default explicitly and to move 
to the default from another fund. By 2011 over 98 per cent of first-time choosers ended up in 
the default fund. Notwithstanding that some new entrants make a choice later, in 2016, 45 per 
cent of all participants were in the default fund. 
 
64. A further illustration that many people find choice difficult are the findings outlined 
in Box 1, that having more options can impede choice.  
 
Box 1 The provision of more options can hamper choice 
Sethi-Iyengar et al. (2004) studied choices in 401(k) pension plans. 
‘While the promise of a greater variety of plans seems beneficial, is there such a thing as too 
much choice? … Most 401(k) plans offer employees a myriad of investment opportunities 
from mutual funds, insurance companies, and/or banks. Indeed, some providers even allow 
employees to invest in individual stocks, and on global capital exchanges allowing for 
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maximum portfolio diversification. But, does bigger necessarily mean better? … [D]o these 
options actually enhance employee welfare? (pp. 83-4) 
‘In one compelling field demonstration, a tasting booth for exotic jams was arranged …. As 
customers passed the tasting booth, they encountered a display with either 6 or 24 different 
flavored jams… [A]lthough extensive choice proved initially more enticing … limited choice 
was ultimately more motivating… 30 percent of the customers who encountered the limited 
selection actually purchased a jam, while only 3 percent of those offered the extensive 
selection made a purchase’ (p. 84). 
 In the case of 401(k) plans, the study found that,  
‘... if a plan offered more funds, this depressed probability of employee 401(k) participation. 
Other things equal, every ten funds added was associated with 1.5 percent to 2 percent drop in 
participation rate…. [P]lans offering (fewer than 10 plans) had significantly higher employee 
participation rates’ (pp. 88-91).  
 
65. MAKING AN UNSUITABLE CHOICE. Examples are legion.  
• Some people will choose actively-managed funds when cheaper index funds might be 
more appropriate. Some will choose a high-fee index fund when a similarly indexed 
fund is available at a lower fee. 
• Many investors do not understand how much administrative charges eat into their 
accumulation, for example that a 1 per cent annual management charge over a full 
career reduces a person’s accumulation by about 20 per cent compared with what it 
would be without the charge.12  
• Some will hold an inadequately-diversified portfolio, most egregiously where 
someone invests heavily in the stock of his/her employer.  
• Some may inappropriately choose and then stay with a pension provider on the basis 
of current inducements, for example a rebate in the first year, without action to move 
after the rebate lapses. 
 
66. TRADING TOO LITTLE, OR TOO MUCH, OR AT THE WRONG TIME. Some people rarely 
change their portfolio. Others trade a lot, taking insufficient account of transactions costs. 
Others trade at the wrong time, selling because the stock market has fallen and buying when 
the stock market is rising. 
 
67. Box 2, based on US experience offers a convenient summary.  
 
Box 2 What individual investors do 
Barber and Odean (2013) survey the behaviour of individual investors. 
‘The bulk of research in modern economics has been built on the notion that human beings 
are rational agents who attempt to maximize wealth while minimizing risk. These agents carefully 
assess the risk and return of all possible investment options to arrive at an investment portfolio that 
suits their level of risk aversion. …  
                                               
12 Barr and Diamond (2010, Box 7.2). See also Choi et al. (2010) and ‘9 in 10 Americans underestimate their 
hidden 401(k) fees’, http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/hidden-401k-fees-plan-retirement-
account-study/ and, more fully, US Federal Research Division (2011). 
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‘A large body of empirical research indicates that real individual investors behave differently 
from investors in these models. Many individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios. Many 
apparently uninformed investors trade actively, speculatively, and to their detriment. And, as a group, 
individual investors make systematic, not random, buying and selling decisions. 
‘Transaction costs are an unambiguous drag on the returns earned by individual investors. 
More surprisingly, many studies document that individual investors earn poor returns even before 
costs. Put another way, many individual investors seem to have a desire to trade actively coupled with 
perverse security selection ability! 
‘Unlike those in models, real investors tend to sell winning investments while holding on to 
their losing investments—a behavior dubbed the “disposition effect”. The disposition effect is among 
the most widely replicated observations regarding the behavior of individual investors. While taxes 
clearly affect the trading of individual investors, the disposition effect tends to maximize, rather than 
minimize, an investor’s tax bill, since in many markets selling winners generates a tax liability that 
might be deferred simply by selling a losing, rather than winning, investment. 
‘Real investors are influenced by where they live and work. They tend to hold stocks of 
companies close to where they live and invest heavily in the stock of their employer. These behaviors 
lead to an investment portfolio far from the market portfolio proscribed by the CAPM and arguably 
expose investors to unnecessarily high levels of idiosyncratic risk.  
‘Real investors are influenced by the media. They tend to buy, rather than sell, stocks when 
those stocks are in the news. This attention-based buying can lead investors to trade too speculatively 
and has the potential to influence the pricing of stocks’ (pp. 1533-4).  
 
During drawdown 
68. Choices by individuals at the time they retire and in subsequent years face parallel 
problems. 
 
69. ANNUITISING TOO LITTLE. Annuitisation insures the individual against longevity risk. 
Relying fully on drawdown forgoes the welfare gains of this insurance. Behavioural 
economics gives insights into why in a voluntary system people do not annuitise, or do not 
annuitise enough – known as the annuity puzzle. 
 
70. Annuitising too little does not mean that mandatory full annuitisation is optimal. 
Uncertainty about future expenditures as well as bequest motives imply that not all wealth 
should be annuitised. Some countries have required annuitisation of at least part of pension 
saving, but with choice over the disposition of rest of the person’s accumulation. 
 
71. MAKING A BAD CHOICE OF ANNUITY PROVIDER. The issues are the same as the choice 
of fund manager during accumulation. The UK example was noted in section 3.2 
 
72. DRAWING DOWN TOO FAST OR TOO SLOWLY. The problem can arise in multiple ways. 
• The pensioner may spend too much too soon, particularly if he or she lives longer 
than planned for. 
• Choices by an individual may take insufficient account of other family members. 
• Or the pensioner may spend too little, being more cautious than mortality rates 
suggest. 
 
73. These findings conform with international experience. A UK study found that,  
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‘ … around 12% of the population analysed … will be at “high-risk” of making poor 
decisions when they reach [State Pension Age] if they are not offered support through 
either guidance and advice or suitable defaults. These are groups with … little or no 
additional [defined-benefit] pension to fall back on. A further 29% … will be at 
“medium risk” of making poor decisions…. This means that around 4 in 10 retirees 
will need significant support over the next ten to fifteen years because they will be 
dependent to a significant degree on the income from their [defined-contribution] 
savings in retirement …, have little other savings and assets to fall back on, have low 
levels of financial skill and engagement, and are less likely to already use a financial 
adviser or be actively targeted by financial advisers in the current market given the 
size of their pension pots (UK Pensions Policy Institute, 2014a, p. 15). 
 
74. For such reasons, the Murray Inquiry argued that,  
‘Greater use of risk pooling could significantly increase retirement incomes generated 
from accumulated balances …. An enduring income stream would give retirees the 
confidence to spend in retirement, which would help to sustain economic growth as 
the population ages and reduce the extent to which longevity risk falls on the 
taxpayer.’ (p. 91). 
 
A.2 Why does that happen 
75. The behaviours described above lead to two results – bad choice, or no choice – 
which require separate explanation.  
 
Why bad choices? 
76. People may not choose well because of limited capacity to make complex choices and 
limited information. The evidence on each is compelling.   
 
77. DIFFICULTY IN MAKING COMPLEX DECISIONS. The behaviour of financial assets over 
time is complex, and understanding is limited by the variation over time in the stochastic 
properties of asset returns. It is not easy to tell which investment managers are good and 
which were lucky. The determinants of the risk-return frontier are not simple to understand. 
Compounding the problem, decision-making requires repeated adjustments, i.e. is not an 
event but a process. What is involved is not like buying a car, where a person can do some 
research and make a decision. Some people understand the basic concepts, others have had 
limited opportunity to learn. 
 
78. LIMITED INFORMATION. The text in Box 3 is from a speech by Arthur Levitt, at the 
time Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), hence based on 
considerable awareness of the actual functioning of markets, and thus illuminating to quote 
extensively. 
 
Box 3 What individual investors know: A practitioner view 
‘Today, I want to talk to you about the SEC perspective on investing Social Security in the stock 
market. … 
‘The SEC's mission is to protect investors. And the potential for investing Social Security in 
equities raises important issues that go to the very heart of investor protection. … 
Increased risk, through greater choice, holds the potential for greater returns. But uninformed 
investors often won't be in a position to capture that potential. They risk making poor investment 
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decisions – perhaps even because they fell prey to fraudulent advice or misleading sales 
practices… 
‘As far as I'm concerned, our nation faces few higher economic priorities than maintaining the 
integrity of our markets. Without it, that fragile cornerstone of our markets – investor confidence 
– crumbles under the weight of uncertainty and doubt.  
But a great influx of new investors can sometimes test that integrity by providing more 
opportunities for fraud. That's something we must consider in the context of the Social Security 
debate. 
‘Some proposals here in the U.S. would have the government administer individual Social 
Security accounts with limited investment choices. Others would have accounts held with private 
firms – providing an individual a much broader range of options. But it is likely that giving people 
the ability to select investment options will provide the unscrupulous with new opportunities to 
deceive and distort. 
‘If we are to have self-directed individual accounts, we must be ready to undertake an 
unprecedented level of broad-scale policing of the equity markets. Without such policies, fraud 
and sales practice abuses may be perpetrated against an army of novice investors. And many of 
those novice investors are our society's most vulnerable citizens. 
‘One need only look at England's experience with Social Security reform. In 1988, the U.K. 
allowed individuals to opt out of their national public pension system and into private accounts. In 
what has become known as the "mis-selling" controversy, high-pressure sales tactics were used to 
persuade people to switch into unsuitable personal pension schemes.  
‘Sales agents often sought too little information from potential clients – many of whom were 
teachers, miners and nurses – to be able to give them proper guidance. In too many instances, they 
gave investors wrong and biased advice. These abusive sales practices, coupled with inadequate 
regulation, led to billions of dollars in losses for investors…. 
‘There is an unacceptably wide gap between financial knowledge and financial 
responsibilities. Closing this "knowledge gap" is among the most important problems we face 
today. It becomes even more of an imperative if Social Security is privatized. 
‘I believe there is one word that every person in America has to understand: and that is risk. 
Risk is an indispensable part of our capital markets. … 
‘There is another word every investor in America needs to understand: cost. Investing in our 
markets costs money. Executing transactions, sending account statements, even switching 
investment managers entail expenses that are paid by the investor. And, fees matter to an 
investor's bottom line. A one percent annual fee will reduce an ending account balance by 17 
percent after 20 years. … 
‘Our research shows that only eight percent of investors say they completely understand the 
expenses that their funds charge. … 
‘Unfortunately, over half of all Americans do not know the difference between a stock and a 
bond … and only 16 percent say they have a clear understanding of what the Individual 
Retirement Account is…. 
‘The sad fact is that most Americans have no idea how much money they need to save for 
retirement. Fifty-five percent have never even tried to figure it out….’ 
Source: Levitt (1998). 
 
 
79. Box 4 summarises the state of play in the USA in more detail. 
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Box 4 Financial literacy in the USA 
A survey by the US Library of Congress (2011) considers financial literacy in the US. 
General knowledge: the study reports (p. 1) that:  
• ‘According to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Investor Education 
Foundation’s 2009 National Financial Capability Study, which consisted of a national sample 
of 1,488 respondents, Americans lack basic financial literacy…. Although a significant 
majority of respondents indicated that they were knowledgeable about finance and highly 
competent in handling day-to-day financial matters, they performed poorly on basic financial 
literacy questions requiring an understanding of inflation, bond prices, interest rates, 
mortgages, and risk. A series of later surveys confirmed this finding. 
• ‘In general, financial literacy increases with age. For example, in a 2008 survey for the 
American Savings Education Council (ASEC) and the AARP, Mathew Greenwald and 
Associates surveyed young Americans from the demographic groups known as Generation X 
(born between 1968 and 1979) and Generation Y (born between 1980 and 1988)…. 
Comparing the results from both surveys, the researchers found that young people tested in 
2008 did not perform as well as the adult investors in the earlier survey. [O]ther studies 
showed a drop-off in performance among the elderly. For example, in FINRA’s 2009 
National Financial Capability Study, adults from 45 to 49 years old performed the best of all 
age-groups, including respondents ages 50 and older, while young adults performed the 
worst.’ 
On fraud (p. 2): 
• ‘In 2006 the NASD Investor Education Foundation … conducted a study that focused on 
consumer fraud directed at older Americans. The NASD Investor Fraud Study distinguished 
between victims and nonvictims of financial fraud. Contrary to expectations, the study found 
that fraud victims actually scored higher than nonvictims on a financial literacy quiz, 
indicating that even knowledgeable investors are susceptible to fraud. 
• ‘The elderly are especially susceptible to fraud because, according to a 2007 study by the 
Investor Protection Trust, almost half of them erroneously believe that securities registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are safe. 
• ‘According to the 2009 National Financial Capability Study, only 15 percent of respondents 
indicated that they had “checked an advisor’s background or credentials with a state or federal 
regulator.”’ 
On fees (pp. 2-3): 
• ‘According to [a survey]… conducted for the SEC in 2008, only 25 percent of respondents 
knew that classes of mutual funds vary by the levels of fees they charge. 
• ‘Among older Americans (at least 55 years old) questioned in the 2008 Health and Retirement 
Survey, two-thirds understood the significant impact of mutual-fund fees on long-term 
returns. Slightly fewer than 40 percent considered it easy to find mutual funds charging 
annual fees of less than 1 percent of assets, suggesting that a large number of respondents 
may have been unaware of the existence of index funds. 
On risks (p. 3): 
• ‘In FINRA’s 2009 Study, a slight majority (52 percent) of respondents understood that mutual 
funds provide a safer return than a single company stock. This is a fundamental tenet of 
diversification theory.’   
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80. Barber and Odean’s (2013) survey concludes that the behaviour of individual 
investors is very different from the predictions of the idealized model. 
‘The investors who inhabit the real world and those who populate academic models 
are distant cousins. In theory, investors hold well diversified portfolios and trade 
infrequently so as to minimize taxes and other investment costs. In practice, investors 
behave differently. They trade frequently and have perverse stock selection ability, 
incurring unnecessary investment costs and return losses. They tend to sell their 
winners and hold their losers, generating unnecessary tax liabilities. Many hold poorly 
diversified portfolios, resulting in unnecessarily high levels of diversifiable risk, and 
many are unduly influenced by media and past experience. Individual investors who 
ignore the prescriptive advice to buy and hold low-fee, well-diversified portfolios, 
generally do so to their detriment’ (2013, p. 1565) 
 
Why no choice? 
81. There are two sets of explanations of why many people make no choice. 
 
82. RECOGNISING LIMITED CAPACITY TO MAKE GOOD CHOICES. As surveys make clear, 
financial literacy is shockingly limited.13 Some people, nevertheless, make choices, and those 
choices may turn out to be bad ones. Others are aware of their limitations in the face of 
complex and sometimes conflicting information, and therefore may make a decision – 
implicit or explicit – to be in the default, regarding that as a safer answer. In our view this is a 
good reason to make no choice when there is a good default. 
 
83. PROCRASTINATION IS WIDESPREAD IN MANY CONTEXTS.  Even where a person is 
financially knowledgeable, an individual account is an ongoing relationship, so that the 
benefits (higher returns, lower charges) in any particular month are small, while the 
transactions costs in terms of time are significant. Thus a worker, particularly a low earner for 
whom the gain in any month is smallest, has little incentive to stay on top of the changing 
array of alternative investments and alternative charges. Inattention can be part of the 
process. 
 
84. Illustrating the point, Aegon (2015, p. 8) reports that over half of people in the UK 
admit to having never checked their pension savings. The Financial Times, citing Scottish 
Widows (2015), reports that,  
‘ … the affluent are not immune to a lack of interest: among those earning above 
£50,000 a year, people with more opportunity than most to save for the future, almost 
four in 10 are still not saving enough for a comfortable retirement …’.14 
 
A.3 What firms do 
85. Since the supply of financial products was covered in detail in the Murray Inquiry, 
discussion here is brief. 
 
86. A competent and well-motivated firm can give individuals advice that suits their 
circumstances ex ante and may or may not turn out well ex post.  However, the financial 
crisis was a firm reminder that biased advice is a continuing problem, and so is fraud. 
                                               
13 See, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell 2014. 
14 ‘Retirement savings: how much is enough’, Financial Times, 19 August 2015 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b3ba77a2-18cd-11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html#axzz3khNqJ5nd . 
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87. THE WRONG PRICE. A seller may charge an inflated price either by selling an 
unsuitable high-cost product, for example, an actively-managed portfolio for a small 
individual account, or by abusing market power to charge a price higher than would emerge 
in a competitive market. 
 
88. Advising someone about what to do when the advice affects the income of the person 
providing advice creates an obvious incentive.  
‘That any sane nation, having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread 
by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking for you, should go on to give a 
surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting off your leg, is enough to make one despair of 
political humanity’ (George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor’s Dilemma, 1911). 
More recently, 
‘The sting operation had the trappings of a Wall Street thriller, except that it was run 
by a team of Harvard and MIT economists. In an audacious experiment, the 
professors dispatched a squad of undercover operatives across Cambridge and Boston 
to pose as middle-class investors and ask retail brokers for investment advice. 
‘Nearly half the brokers … steered clients toward actively managed mutual funds. 
Those funds — which sometimes beat the market but most often don’t — carry higher 
fees that enrich brokers and fund managers but, critics say, stunt the growth of 
middle-class nest egg’15. 
 
89. An indirect indication of the extent to which such practices occur is the strength of the 
US financial industry’s resistance to stronger regulation, for example a rule proposed by the 
Department of Labor to impose a fiduciary responsibility on retirement plan advisers.16  
 
90. THE WRONG PRODUCT. Misselling is an extreme case of biased advice, an example 
being the UK in the years after 1988 when workers were given the freedom to move from the 
state scheme or an occupational plan to an individual account. As a result of a major sales 
drive, many people, often women and poorly paid, were persuaded by deceptive advertising 
and face-to-face selling to move out of occupational pensions or the state scheme into 
personal plans.  
 
91. Over time it became clear that many people were worse-off as a result, and over 
500,000 such pensions were investigated for misselling. A decade later, the Director of the 
Office of Fair Trading could still write: 
‘Many personal pension plans are … simply poor value. Their benefits are consumed 
in the high levels of expenses needed to support the marketing effort and the active 
management of the funds. These expenses are often loaded on the early years of the 
plan, so that they bear disproportionately on plans where the contributions are 
discontinued because of changes in personal circumstances. In comparison with most 
                                               
15 ‘Financial firms lobby hard against stricter protections‘ Boston Globe, November 16, 2014, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2014/11/16/rules-protect-middle-class-investors-face-tough-fight-
obama-final-two-years/kEzo0lm4qvt4wNIMIQMdVJ/story.html).  See also Pool et al. (2015). 
16 See, for example, ‘Battle over DOL’s Fiduciary rule gets dirty’, Huffington Post, 23 June 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-solin/the-battle-over-the-dols_b_7611170.html?utm_hp_ref=fifty&ir=Fifty, 
and ‘Here is what’s at stake with the conflict of interest (“fiduciary”) rule’, Economic Policy Institute, 30 May 
2017, http://www.epi.org/publication/here-is-whats-at-stake-with-the-conflict-of-interest-fiduciary-rule/ 
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occupational schemes, the level of employers’ contributions may be inadequate or 
non-existent’ (UK Office of Fair Trading, 1997, p. 8). 
In response, the Financial Services Authority imposed on the pensions industry a requirement 
to offer compensation, the total cost of which exceeded £10 billion. 
 
A.4  A central implication: The simple model of choice and competition does 
not work well 
92. The image of competition has many firms supplying commodities and demanders 
purchasing suitable products at the lowest price available. The approach works well enough 
in a wide range of areas such as cars, restaurants, supermarkets, holidays. But it works well 
for a reason – those are areas in which consumers are reasonably well-informed and learn 
readily from repeated experience and from each other. They work less well where consumers 
are not well-informed, which is particularly the case for complex products, and there is 
limited or late feedback on the results of such choices. Simple theory argues that not 
everyone needs to be well-informed because the presence of enough well-informed 
consumers improves what is available to badly-informed consumers (search externalities). 
However there may not be enough well-informed consumers or, as discussed by Armstrong 
(2014), badly-informed consumers may fund generous deals for well-informed consumers 
(Armstrong refers to the latter effect as ‘ripoff externalities’). 
 
93. As has been learned repeatedly since Chile initiated the mandate of funds from private 
suppliers, competition often takes place through advertising rather than by offering lower 
prices. The results include (a) higher prices than the simplest model-based conclusion of 
marginal cost pricing, and (b) diverse pricing of uniform (or nearly uniform) products. 
Moreover, this process does not deliver enough important information about the choices. In 
particular, markets with significant frictions have incentives for suppliers to obscure some 
aspects of the full product (Gabaix and Laibson 2006).  Indeed, with complex products, 
descriptions are likely to mislead and may be designed to obfuscate (Célérier and Vallée 
2014). 
 
94. Successive governments in Chile have grappled with administrative costs since the 
start of their reforms in the early 1980s, repeatedly changing the process of switching 
providers. An auction mechanism for new entrants is a significant recent advance but not a 
complete solution. A plausible interpretation is that the Chile experience shows how far one 
can get with a design that locates competition in the market, but also the limitations of that 
approach. 
 
95. US experience is equally illuminating. Consider the fees for S&P 500 index funds in 
the US, which are diverse despite the identical goal. The data in Figure 1 are striking. 
Workers who end up in a default because they make no choice are not likely to pressure 
prices across diverse offers of a default, even if the funds are required to have identical goals. 
Diversity of portfolios results in wide diversity in fees, as Table 2 shows. In Sweden,  
‘AP7 [the default fund] charges a fund management fee of 0.05-0.12 percent, compared to 
an average of 0.3-0.4 percent after discounts for all premium pension funds.17 
 
                                               
17 Fund management fees, http://ap7cms9.episerverhosting.com/en/About-AP7/Your-pension/How-to-choose-a-
premium-pension-fund/Fund-management-fees/ 
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mutual funds 0.83% 1.33% 2.15% 0.78% 1.41% 
World bond 
mutual funds 0.62% 1.01% 1.84% 0.65% 1.11% 
Source: Collins and Duval (2017, Figure 3). 
 
A.5 Addressing possible counter-arguments 
96. A number of arguments are commonly made about pension design: 
• Choice is beneficial because it allows consumers to express their preferences; 
• Competition is necessary for financial markets to do their job; 
• Poor choices can largely be resolved by better financial education; 
• Poor choices can largely be resolved by delegating choice. 
 
97. The arguments and empirical evidence in this Appendix should make it clear why we 
disagree with those arguments in their simple form, so discussion here is brief. 
• Choice. Choice is generally beneficial where consumers are well-informed but not 
necessarily where choices are technical and complex.  Australians understand why 
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counter. Choosing a pension fund is more like choosing pharmaceutical drugs than 
choosing automobiles.  Our recommendations have choice for those who wish to 
exercise it but, equally, remove pressure to make choice from people who do not. 
• Competition. Financial markets have the essential task of allocating people’s savings 
into productive investment, and competition between financial firms is a core part of 
that process. What is needed is an architecture that locates competition in the correct 
places. The proposals in sections 2 and 3 seek explicitly to do that. 
• Financial education. It is highly desirable to improve financial education, but the 
complexity of the issues makes it unrealistic to expect the education approach to turn 
a typical individual into a well-informed actor in financial markets. 
• Delegating choice. It is, of course, possible to buy advice. But evaluating providers is 
difficult: it is often not clear whether a past record of success is luck or judgement; in 
addition, the past is no guide to the future;  and, as discussed in section A3, not all 
advisers optimise from the client’s point of view. 
 
98. The main message in this Appendix is that the Productivity Commission Draft Report 
got it right in its central conclusion that for the design of the default, competition for the 
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